We take a closer look at the question of whether dual traders in futures markets are indeed informed traders. Underpinning this question is the intuition that a dual trader's decision to trade on his own account is not random, but is endogenously determined by his expectations of trading profits related to this decision. We employ a simultaneous equations model with two endogenous variables: (1) the binary decision of own account trading (or not), and (2) the trading profit resulting from his own account trading. Our test of whether dual traders are informed traders comprises of estimating the correlation between the error terms of the two equations in our model, where one error term proxies for a dual trader's unobserved private information and the other captures his abnormal profit. Upon estimating the model, using the Bayesian approach, we find no evidence of significant correlation between a dual trader's private information and his abnormal profit. Overall, dual traders appear to be uninformed traders with distinct trade-related characteristics.
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Introduction
In the wake of the seminal work by Kyle (1985) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , and Easley and O'Hara (1987) , there has developed a large body of research examining how informed traders impact asset prices and market liquidity (see O'Hara (1995) for a summary).
Unfortunately, the implications from this body of work are difficult to test, due to the simple fact that informed trading is unobservable. Consequently, empirical researchers have had to resort to inferring informed trading through indirect means, such as through trading profits (Fishman and Longstaff (1992) ), through trade sizes (Barclay and Warner (1993) ), through trade sizes and trader types (Chakravarty (2001) ), and through the timing of trades (Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) ).
In the current paper, we adopt a new empirical technique to investigate if dual traders are informed traders. Dual trading is an age-old custom in futures markets whereby some floor traders are allowed to trade both for themselves and for their customers. Our investigation is motivated by an ongoing Congressional debate on whether dual traders should enjoy such a privilege (see Chakravarty and Li (2001) ) and the extant literature, both theoretical and empirical, that is silent on the specific question addressed here. 1 Underpinning the 1 Specifically, the theoretical literature on dual trading, for example, starts with the basic assumption that dual traders are informed traders and then investigates the effects of their trading strategies (through piggybacking and/or front running) on market liquidity and the informativeness of prices (see, for example, Grossman (1989) , Roell (1990) , Fishman and Longstaff (1992) , Chakravarty (1994) , and Sarkar (1995) ). The empirical literature on dual trading can be broadly classified into three themes. The first theme focuses on the liquidity effects of various dual trading restrictions imposed on the futures markets (Smith and Whaley (1994) , Chang, Locke and Mann (1994) , Chang and Locke (1996) , and Locke, Sarkar and Wu (1999) ). The second theme of the empirical literature examines the microstructure of futures markets under competitive market making (Manaster and Mann (1996) , and Ferguson and Mann (2001) ). The third theme, represented by Chakravarty and Li (2002) , examines the timing and determinants of own account trading by dual traders.
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Congressional debate is the issue of whether these traders can (and do) take advantage of their privileged position of observing their customers' orders to make personal trading profits.
We employ a simple, yet powerful, test to investigate if dual traders are informed traders. In particular, we jointly examine a dual trader's own account trading decision and profitability by employing a simultaneous equations model with a binary endogenous variablethe decision of whether to trade on his own accountand a trading profit variable.
In the own account trading equation, the error term captures the dual trader's (unobservable) private information. In the profit equation, the error term captures his abnormal profit. A significant correlation between the error term in the own account trading decision equation and the error term in the profit equation would indicate that the dual trader possesses (unobservable) private information that leads to abnormal profit. An important feature of our modeling framework is that we isolate the abnormal trading profit associated with a dual trader's personal trades from his overall trading profit and correlate the abnormal profit with the unobserved private information (if any) of the dual trader. In contrast, Chakravarty and Li (2002) examine if dual traders are informed traders by regressing their own account trades on variables capturing information (derived from observing their customers' orders), liquidity supply, and inventory control, while Fishman and Longstaff (1992) infer dual traders' information from the overall trading profit associated with their personal trades.
Our data are time series of audit trails at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) during the first half of 1992 compiled by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
The data provide information on trade time, price, quantity, trade direction (buyer or seller) and the trader's identification. They are used internally by the CFTC for regulation and enforcement 3 purposes. We estimate our system of equations on each of the 101 most active dual traders in the data using Bayesian techniques.
We find weak evidence, at best, to suggest dual traders are informed traders. That is, there is no significant correlation between a dual trader's abnormal trading profit and his unobservable private information. We, however, identify an inventory control effect in dual traders' own account trading. That is, dual traders are more likely to buy for (sell from) their personal account if their inventory level is below (above) zero. We also find that not all of dual traders' own account trades are correlated with positive trading profits. Finally, there is strong evidence to suggest that dual traders are distinctly heterogeneous in their trade-related characteristics. Overall, our results imply that dual traders are uninformed a finding that has important policy implications, in light of the ongoing Congressional debate on imposing personal trading restrictions on dual traders.
Our research is most closely related to, and supports the conclusions of, Chakravarty and Li (2002) who examine, at the individual trader level, the timing and the determinants of dual traders' personal trades. Using correlation statistics and time series regressions, Chakravarty and Li find that there is an absence of any trade timing by dual traders in relation to the execution of their customers' orders, and the determinants of dual traders' personal trades appear to be liquidity supply and inventory rebalancing. In this paper, we focus specifically on the informativeness of dual traders, by estimating the statistical correlation between the private information of dual traders and their abnormal trading profits.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical model used to examine dual trader informativeness and provides relevant details on Bayesian 4 estimation. Section 3 introduces the data and defines the explanatory variables. Section 4 reports our findings. Section 5 concludes.
2.
Methodology
The Simultaneous Equations Model
We model a dual trader's decision to trade on his own account and the effect of this decision on his profit in two separate equations. The (own account) trading decision is discrete and is modeled using a probit regression. 
where Ii,t is the binary choice variable on own account trading by dual trader i in time interval t, X2,it is an n × k2 matrix of observable trader and market characteristics, β2,i is a vector of k2 parameters and e2,it is the error term capturing the abnormal profit in time interval t. πi,t is the trading profit of dual trader i, in time interval t, computed as in Fishman and Longstaff (1992) .
Specifically, the trading profit of dual trader i in time interval t on day d is obtained as 3
In summary, equation (1) Under our simultaneous equations modeling approach, the error terms in equations (1) and (2), Note that in Σ, Var(e1,it) = 1 because Ii,t is only observed as a binary variable, leaving only two free parameters 22 12 ,σ σ (the off-diagonal element and the second diagonal element) to be estimated. This creates complications in the estimation procedure and requires us to reparameterize Σ and to estimate the two free parameters separately. 4 In particular, we 4 The complication arises because when we have three free parameters to estimate in a 2x2 variancecovariance matrix, Σ, from Zellner (1971, pp. 224-227) we know that, conditional on the data and the regression parameter vector, δ, the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix Σ -1 (with its three free parameters), follows a Wishart distribution; while conditional on the data and Σ, δ follows a multivariate normal distribution. Unfortunately, in our current setting, due to the probit equation (1), the variance of decompose the joint bivariate normal distribution for
, 1 in equations (1) and (2) 
From here on, we focus on the reparameterized variance-covariance matrix (1) and (2) are estimated separately, and our simultaneous equations model, are both of interest. Statistically, the difference between the two approaches is that the former sets the covariance term 12 σ equal to zero while the latter leaves 12 σ unconstrained. Economically, the key issue is whether dual trader i possess unobservable private information that is systematically related to his abnormal trading profit, after controlling for observables such as inventory effects, liquidity, etc. Put differently, the question is whether or not a dual trader's own account trading decision is exogenous to his the error term in equation (1) is fixed at 1, which reduces the number of free parameters from three to two and precludes us from using the standard results discussed above. Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995) to simplify the computation of the Bayes factor
where 
and y represents the data.
Stacking the time series observations and letting ), , ( , ,
equations (1) and (2) 
For simplicity, we rewrite equation (8) as follows
where
are defined before, ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product, and n is the sample size.
Estimation Using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Method
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We assume the following prior distribution
MVN denotes a multivariate normal distribution, N denotes a univariate normal distribution, and G denotes a Gamma distribution (Poirier, 1995, pp. 98-99) .
Throughout the paper, informative priors ) , ( ) (
are used for the regression parameter , δ and we vary our choices of the prior parameters . We also take into account two implementational considerations as in Li (1998 Li ( , 1999 δ, centered at a vector of zeros, and the mean for the variance-covariance matrix, Σ, is close to an identity matrix. 6 We follow the method developed in Li (1998) to conduct a Bayesian analysis of our empirical model in equation (9). The Bayesian techniques involved are data augmentation and the Gibbs sampler. Data augmentation is a scheme to argument the observed discrete data, such as the binary choice of dual traders' own account trading decision I, by the unobservable continuous data, such as dual traders' latent incremental utility I*, in order to simplify the calculation of the likelihood/posterior (see Tanner and Wong (1987) ). Gibbs sampling is a simulation tool for obtaining marginal distributions from a non-normalized joint density (Casella and George (1992) , and Gelfand and Smith (1990) ). Both techniques are special cases of the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach (see Chib and Greenberg (1996) for a survey). 7
In particular, the Bayesian estimation proceeds as follows. These four full conditionals, including one data augmentation step in equation (11), complete the MCMC algorithm. Some intuition of these four steps is offered as follows. In Step 1 (equation (11)), we augment the observed discrete data I with the unobservable continuous data * I (i.e., the incremental utility of dual trader i associated with his own account trading decision). This implies generating the latent incremental utility variable I*, based on our observation of dual trader i's own account trading decision I. When the augmented data are generated consistently within the structure of the model, the distribution of the augmented data converges asymptotically to the distribution of the observed data. In Steps 2-4 (equations (12)- (14)), conditional on the observed and augmented data, approximate posteriors for the model parameters may be obtained using Gibbs sampling. We iterate between the data augmentation and the Gibbs sampler steps and our Bayesian estimates of the model parameters , , , 2 12 σ σ δ are obtained as sample averages of these Gibbs draws.
Data and Explanatory Variables
The Data
Our data consist of audit trail transaction records of eight futures contracts traded at the CME during the first six months of 1992 and are also used in Li (2001, 2002) .
The contracts are live cattle, hogs, pork bellies, feeder cattle, lumber, Canadian dollars, T-bills, and S&P 400. The two million plus transaction records provide a detailed look at the complete trading history of all floor traders in these eight futures pits. We supplement the above data with the daily settlement price data for each of the contracts over the sample period in order to calculate the traders' personal trading profits.
The audit trail data record each transaction twice, once for each party to a trade. An exchange algorithm, called the computerized trade reconstruction, uses each trader's independently reported sequence of trades, in conjunction with the time and sales data, to time each trade within a minute. Since some timing errors are likely, we perform our analysis in five-minute time intervals.
In addition to trade time, the audit trail records provide price, quantity, specifics of the The criterion for a specific floor trader to be included in our sample as an active dual trader is that the number of his dual trading days exceeds 50, out of a maximum of 126 trading days during the first six months of 1992. With this filter, we obtain a total of 101 active dual traders in our sample across the eight futures contracts. These 101 traders account for well over half the total volume in our original data. Other details of the data are provided in Chakravarty and Li (2001) .
The Explanatory Variables
The dependent variable which captures a dual trader's own account trading decision in equation (1) is trade dummy, I, which equals 1 if the dual trader trades on own account in time interval t, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable which captures a dual trader's own account trading profit in equation (2) is profit, π, computed using equation (3).
Our choice of a parsimonious set of exogenous variables, determining the trading decision of dual traders and their personal trading profit, is based on the existing literature. 9
The set of explanatory variables can be broadly classified into variables capturing inventory effects, liquidity, and information inherent in the order flow. Thus, inventory is defined as a dual trader's own account buy trades minus his own account sell trades, cumulated from the beginning of a trading day to time interval t, assuming that a dual trader only has full control of his own account trades. (1) and (2) are estimated for the 101 active dual traders in our sample.
Results
Dual Trader Informativeness
There are 101 sets of coefficient estimates, one for each dual trader in our sample. We present, in Tables 1 and 2 , the numbers of positive and negative coefficients, as well as the numbers of positive coefficients that are two standard deviations above zero, and the numbers of negative coefficients that are two standard deviations below zero, respectively.
From Table 1 , we find that dual traders are more likely to trade on own account when their inventory level is away from zero. This is shown by the either positive or negative coefficients on inventory. There is also sporadic evidence to suggest that dual traders either trade before or after executing their customers' orders, a result consistent with Chakravarty and Li (2002) .
From Table 2 , we find that while there is some evidence to suggest that dual traders earn positive profit through own account tradingas illustrated by the sign of the coefficient on trade dummythe evidence is weak at best. Moreover, there is similar weak evidence to suggest that dual traders in our sample possess significant private information that bring them abnormal trading profits, as shown by the estimate of correlation coefficient
The results for the median dual trader in each of the eight contracts are provided in Table 3 , to provide a sense of the magnitude of the estimated regression coefficients for a typical trader. For a given contract, the median dual trader is a trader whose number of dual trading days is closest to the median value of dual trading days among all selected dual traders in that contract. The estimation results of all other dual traders are omitted for brevity, but are available from us on request. Table 3 reports the posterior means of the coefficients, with the 16 corresponding posterior standard deviations in parentheses. The Bayes factors in Table 3 Panel C indicate that for each median dual trader, the data strongly favor a model with a zero covariance term (except for the T-bill trader). 10 This result is consistent with our findings on the correlation coefficient ) / ( 22 12 12 σ σ ρ = (also shown in Table 3 Panel C) that the posterior estimates of the correlation coefficient are all close to zero with large standard deviations, and implies that we could simplify our model to the single equation model where each of equations (1) and (2) is estimated separately. Economically, these results imply that dual traders do not possess private information that leads to abnormal trading profits.
Dual trader heterogeneity
In this section, we investigate if dual traders are homogeneous or whether they have distinct observable characteristics (i.e., heterogeneous). Our investigation is motivated by the theoretical literature on informed trading that treats (multiple) informed traders as homogeneous (see, for example, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) ) and uninformed traders collectively as non-strategic traders suffering losses from trading against the informed traders (see O'Hara (1995) ). In addition, Manaster and Mann (1996) report that locals in the futures markets appear to have varying inventory adjustment rates and that, over time, traders, long (short) in futures contracts, appear to display relatively greater (a relative lack of) skills at selling (buying) and a relative lack of (relatively greater) skill at buying (selling). The authors argue that their evidence is inconsistent with the assumption of homogeneous information and homogeneous risk aversion among dual traders. Locke, Sarkar and Wu (1999) , in fact, suggest that traders could be heterogeneous with respect to trading skills, and that the aggregate measures of trading costs, such as average bid-ask spreads, could be misleading. Consistent with the above, they develop a theoretical model based on dealer heterogeneity.
Before embarking on a formal test of dual trader heterogeneity, we see, from Table 3 , that the coefficient estimates vary significantly across the eight median traders in our sample an indication of possible differences across traders. To rigorously test for heterogeneity, however, we obtain the marginal likelihood of the unrestricted model based on the 101
individual dual trader models of equations (1) and (2), and the marginal likelihood of the restricted model based on pooling the time series observations from all 101 traders and estimating equations (1) and (2). The resulting Bayes factor far exceeds 10, indicating that there is significant heterogeneity among the dual traders in our sample. 11
Our findings have important implications for theoretical research that tends to treat all traders, especially uninformed liquidity traders, collectively as automatons. 12 That is, the extant theoretical research includes uninformed traders simply to obtain equilibria where an informed trader will trade and uses the resultant equilibria to compute comparative statics related to market liquidity and informativeness of prices. Our evidence on trader heterogeneity indicates that this approach may be an over-simplification of reality.
In sum, we do not find strong evidence to suggest that dual traders possess private information that leads to their making abnormal trading profits through personal trading.
There is weak evidence, at best, to support a direct and positive connection between own account trading by dual traders and their profits. We also provide direct evidence of dual trader heterogeneity with respect to their trade-related characteristics.
Conclusion
Using detailed audit trail transaction data compiled by the CFTC and a simultaneous equations modeling framework, we investigate if dual traders are informed traders. Our study goes significantly beyond existing research. In particular, we recognize and account for the potential endogeneity between the own account trading decision of a dual trader and his trading profit. Our methodology also allows us to isolate the abnormal trading profit associated with a dual trader's personal trades and to compute its correlation with the unobserved private information (if any) of the dual trader.
The estimation of our simultaneous equations model is performed on each of the 101 dual traders in our sample, using the MCMC method. Most significantly, we find that dual traders do not possess any significant private information. We also uncover strong evidence that dual traders are heterogeneous in terms of trade-related characteristics. Overall, our results have important policy implications in that they cast doubt on the notion that dual traders are informed traders. Rather, dual traders appear to be observationally-distinct and uninformed. (1) across our sample of 101 dual traders in eight futures contracts. For each futures contract, the first row gives the numbers of positive (+ve) and negative (-ve) coefficient estimates; the second row gives the numbers of positive coefficient estimates that are two standard deviations above zero, and the numbers of negative coefficient estimates that are two standard deviations below zero, respectively. The dependent variable in equation (1) is own account trade dummy (I), which equals 1 if dual trader i trades on his own account in time interval t, 0 otherwise. Inventory is the cumulative difference between a dual trader's own account buy trades and his own account sell trades, from the beginning of a trading day to time interval t-1. Customer netbuy is the difference between a dual trader's customer buy volume and his customer sell volume in time interval t and is the liquidity proxy. NLAG1 -NLAG3 are a dual trader's customer netbuy in time intervals t-1 up to t-3; and NLEAD1 -NLEAD3 are a dual trader's customer netbuy in time intervals t+1 up to t+3. These lead and lag variables are the information proxies. (1) is own account trade dummy (I), which equals 1 if dual trader i trades on his own account in time interval t, 0 otherwise. Inventory is the cumulative difference between a dual trader's own account buy trades and his own account sell trades, from the beginning of a trading day to time interval t-1. Customer netbuy is the difference between a dual trader's customer buy volume and his customer sell volume in time interval t and is the liquidity proxy. NLAG1 -NLAG3 are a dual trader's customer netbuy in time intervals t-1 up to t-3; and NLEAD1 -NLEAD3 are a dual trader's customer netbuy in time intervals t+1 up to t+3. These lead and lag variables are the information proxies. The dependent variable in equation (2) is own account trading profit (π). Trade dummy equals 1 if dual trader i trades on his own account in time interval t, 0 otherwise. BF01 gives the Bayes factor comparing the model with a zero covariance term (the null H0) to the model where the variance-covariance matrix is unconstrained (the alternative H1). 
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